The Dualism of the Practical Reason: Some Interpretations and Responses by Orsi, Francesco
  
Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, X, 2008, 2, pp. 19-41 
 
 
The Dualism of the Practical Reason: Some Interpretations 
and Responses 
 
 
Francesco Orsi 
Facoltà di Filosofia 
Università di Roma “La Sapienza” 
francescoorsi@hotmail.com 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Sidgwick’s dualism of the practical reason is the idea that since egoism and utilitarianism 
aim both to have rational supremacy in our practical decisions, whenever they conflict 
there is no stronger reason to follow the dictates of either view. The dualism leaves us 
with a practical problem: in conflict cases, we cannot be guided by practical reason to 
decide what all things considered we ought to do. There is an epistemic problem as well: 
the conflict of egoism and utilitarianism shows that they cannot be both self-evident 
principles. Only the existence of a just God could, for Sidgwick, prevent the conflict and 
thus solve the dualism. The paper first explores in detail and rejects some reconstructions 
of the dualism: a purely logical account, and accounts whereby egoism and utilitarianism 
are principles of pro tanto reasons or of sufficient reasons. Then it proposes a better ac-
count, in which egoism and utilitarianism are logically compatible and yet conflicting 
principles of all things considered reason. The account is shown to fit with Sidgwick’s 
view of the dualism and of its practical and epistemic pitfalls. Finally, some views are 
discussed as to the wider positive significance of the dualism, regarded as a challenge to 
the rational authority of morality, or as indicating the structural opposition of agent-
relative and agent-neutral reasons, or again as the imperfect yet amendable attempt at a 
comprehensive pluralist theory of practical reasons. 
 
 
1. Defining the Dualism of the Practical Reason 
 
Henry Sidgwick famously concludes his Methods of Ethics (ME) with the fol-
lowing reasoning. The two methods, i.e., the two “rational procedure[s] by 
which we determine what individual human beings ‘ought’…to do” (ME: 1), 
which have survived rational scrutiny, namely egoism and utilitarianism, 
can conflict in particular occasions. Mere experience shows that there is no 
necessary coincidence between what we ought to do on egoistic grounds and 
what we ought to do on utilitarian ones. The methods can conflict in this 
sense. Only an all powerful and just being (God), could produce a necessary 
coincidence, whereby, in particular, if we do what we ought on utilitarian 
grounds, then we do what is required by egoism: the utilitarian act will be 
the act that best serves our self-interest, because, being also the morally 
 
FRANCESCO ORSI 
 20
right act, we will be rewarded for having done it by God in the afterlife (and 
we will be accordingly punished if we did not do it). But we cannot demon-
strate, nor postulate, the existence of God, and of an afterlife. Therefore, 
egoism and utilitarianism can conflict, and do in fact conflict. But then 
there is “an ultimate and fundamental contradiction in our apparent intui-
tions of what is Reasonable in conduct” (ME 508). The possibility of practi-
cal conflict between egoism and utilitarianism shows that the two methods 
are, in some sense, contradictory. And a “contradiction” between the best 
methods of ethics we have looks like something we have reason to worry 
about.1 
This is by and large what Sidgwick says. Admittedly, he does say some-
thing else. We have further reasons to worry about the contradiction. One is 
epistemological: “it would seem to follow that the apparently intuitive op-
eration of the Practical Reason, manifested in these contradictory judge-
ments, is after all illusory” (ibidem). This is an unclear remark. For it can be 
taken to mean that, when we come to contradictory judgements about what 
we ought to do, these very judgements grandly present themselves as the 
expression of Practical Reason, but, since the idea of Practical Reason ex-
pressing itself contradictorily makes no sense, we are mistaken to take either 
or both judgements as what Practical Reason has to say. However, this is 
not what Sidgwick means. Practical Reason can and does express itself con-
tradictorily, but it should not, and that’s precisely the problem. So what is 
illusory? If two propositions can be found to be contradictory, in themselves 
or in their consequences, they cannot be both intuitive, i.e. self-evident: 
“the propositions accepted as self-evident must be mutually consistent” 
(ME: 341). Hence, it is illusory to think of egoism and utilitarianism as the 
intuitive, self-evident expression of Practical Reason. And things are not 
good if Practical Reason, that “chief department of our thought”, cannot 
issue self-evident substantive normative statements.  
There is another epistemological worry. “If we gave up the hope of at-
taining a practical solution of this fundamental contradiction…it would 
[not] become reasonable for us to abandon morality altogether: but it would 
seem necessary to abandon the idea of rationalising it completely” (ME: 
508).2 To “rationalise morality completely” here means, more or less, to be 
able to find a straightforward answer to every question of what we have 
                                                 
1 The expression “dualism of the practical reason” occurs in ME: xii (Preface to the Sec-
ond Edition), xxi (Preface to the Sixth Edition), and 404, note 1. He regards it as “the 
profoundest problem of Ethics” (ME: 386, note 4). 
2 See also ME: 498. 
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reason to do when all things have been considered. In cases of conflict be-
tween egoism and utilitarianism, we have no straightforward answer, for — 
to anticipate — it will both be true and false that we ought to do a certain 
act. A less than complete rationalisation is, for Sidgwick, a sign of failure in 
our normative thought.  
Finally, there is a practical worry. It is not the obvious one that in cases 
of conflict we just do not know what to do. Rather, it is this. Since in cases 
of conflict we have no more reason to do what egoism requires than to do 
what utilitarianism requires, whatever we do we will not have reasons and 
Reason on our side: “practical reason, being divided against itself, would 
cease to be a motive on either side; the conflict would have to be decided by 
the comparative preponderance of one or other of two groups of non-
rational impulses” (ibidem). Practical reason ceases to be a motive in the 
sense that there are no further reasons to guide our decision. This does not 
mean that we will end up doing something for which there is no reason: self-
interest or overall happiness would still provide some reason (if there were a 
third option which did not maximize either self-interest or general happi-
ness, we would have no reason to choose that). But practical reason can only 
guide and motivate us so far. In either case we would not be able to refer to 
what we do as to what we ought to do period. The conflict will then have to 
be “decided” by non-rational impulses both in the sense that it would defi-
nitely be unreasonable to choose neither option, and that our choice of either 
cannot but represent the preponderance of one impulse over another (say, a 
narrow concern for our happiness, or a sense of sympathy), where there is, in 
the particular case, no reason for such preponderance — no matter how 
much we can repeat to ourselves, for instance, that acting on an utilitarian 
impulse is a better option because it is the morally right one.3 Therefore this 
is the practical problem: Accepting the best that practical reason has to of-
fer, i.e. egoism and utilitarianism, commits us to knowingly deliberating and 
acting, at least sometimes, not against practical reason, or irrationally, but 
without enough practical reason — which is puzzling, if coherent, and in 
practice not very comforting, especially if cases of conflict are more frequent 
than Sidgwick appears to believe.  
Sidgwick thus is explicit — or relatively easy to interpret — o n the pit-
falls of the “contradiction”, but not so much on the nature of the contradic-
tion itself. We know that it involves some contradiction between ethical 
judgements stemming from egoism and utilitarianism, that is in some way 
                                                 
3 Strictly speaking then, it is the preponderance that is non-rational, not the impulses 
themselves. 
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generated by practical conflict, that God and only God could “solve” the 
conflict and prevent the contradiction. How can all of this be coherently 
brought together and, moreover, in such a way that we come to see Sidg-
wick’s dualism as something to worry about, both in itself and for the rea-
sons just discussed?  
Two influential accounts of the dualism are not satisfactory, albeit for 
different reasons. The first is a purely theoretical account. It takes Sidg-
wick’s talk of contradiction in its most direct sense. C. D. Broad thus ex-
pressed it: 
 
Sidgwick’s difficulty was that both the principle that I ought to be equally 
concerned about equally good states of mind, no matter where they may oc-
cur, and the principle that I ought to be more concerned about a good state 
in my own mind than about an equally good state in any other mind, 
seemed to him self-evident when he inspected each separately. And yet they 
are plainly inconsistent with each other, so that, in one case at least an ethi-
cal principle which is in fact false must be appearing to be necessarily true 
(Broad 1930: 245). 
 
This account formulates egoism and utilitarianism as mutually inconsis-
tent theories about what we ought to be more concerned about. Utilitarian-
ism affirms, and egoism denies, that I ought to be equally concerned about 
equally good states of mind no matter where they occur. It is not clear that 
this reading is consistent with Sidgwick’s definition of methods as rational 
procedures for determining what we ought to do. Broad’s restatement, first, 
does not specify a reason for being or not being equally concerned about 
equally good states of mind. But we would have thought that a procedure is 
rational insofar as it tells us what reasons determine what we ought to do. 
Second, egoism and utilitarianism would not be theories about what we 
ought to do, but about the required intensity of concern.  
Moreover, if it is assumed that the object of concern are “equally good 
states of mind” in both cases, and one leaves “good” unspecified, then, since 
for Sidgwick what is good on the whole is, roughly, what anyone has reason 
or ought to desire, then Sidgwick’s egoist, on Broad’s interpretation, already 
ought to be concerned in some degree about others’ state of mind — only, 
not in the same degree as hers. This may be a choice of interpretive sympa-
thy on Broad’s part: since egoism as “Pure Egoism, i.e. the doctrine that I 
ought not to desire to any degree as an end the occurrence of good states of 
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mind in anyone but myself, seems plainly false” (ibidem),4 so the dualism 
would be a false problem, something we need not worry about. However, 
not even on Broad’s construal the dualism is something we need to worry 
too much about: Broad’s egoist already accepts that she ought to be con-
cerned about others’ happiness, and not for purely instrumental reasons. 
Broad’s egoist, that is, is one who has embraced the “point of view of the 
universe”. And once the egoist embraces that point of view, for Sidgwick, on 
the one hand, it is arbitrary to distinguish her own happiness as more im-
portant than any others’ equal happiness (ME: 421); on the other hand, it is 
too late for her to reassert the importance of the agent’s point of view, as 
one grounding stronger reasons for the agent. The agent’s point of view — 
Sidgwick implies — will irreversibly cease to have its special significance. So 
Broad softens things up by begging the question against egoism.  
But even if we amend Broad’s account in these respects we will not get a 
fair picture of the dualism. For, by construing it as a matter of logically in-
consistent principles, it makes no sense of Sidgwick’s idea that, without 
practical conflict, and thanks to God, there would be no contradiction. 
Broad in fact embraces the point: 
 
No God, however powerful and however benevolent, can alter the fact that 
these two principles are logically incompatible and that therefore something 
which seemed self-evident to Sidgwick must in fact have been false (Broad 
1930: 253). 
 
The incompatibility should have been apparent to Sidgwick from the 
outset. Therefore this is not a Sidgwickian interpretation of the dualism. In-
deed, any purely logical account will not be Sidgwickian. One way of mend-
ing Broad’s wording could be this (understanding “right” as shorthand 
“what there is most reason to do”):5 
 
Egoism (E): There is one and only one way for an act to be right: maximiz-
ing agent-utility. Therefore acts that maximize agent-utility but not utility 
are right, and acts that maximize utility but not agent-utility are not right.  
 
                                                 
4 If “good” here again means “good for anyone”, then pure egoism would also be self-
contradictory. This was G. E. Moore’s (in)famous reaction to the dualism (see Moore, 
1993: 150ff). I take it that this is not Broad’s view (see Broad 1942), so the occurrence of 
“good” is an unintended slip. 
5 See Skorupski 2001: 69.  
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Utilitarianism (U): There is one and only one way for an act to be right: 
maximizing utility. Therefore acts that maximize utility but not agent-
utility are right, and acts that maximize agent-utility but not utility are not 
right. 
 
E and U are logically incompatible. The fact that a God could make E-
right and U-right acts coincide only provides some practical reassurance. 
And yet for Sidgwick God could remove the contradiction itself. Thus we 
must make sense of a contradiction that arises not purely in virtue of the 
content of the principles, but also, decisively, in virtue of how the world is 
like: with or without God. Logical accounts of the dualism assume, unchari-
tably to Sidgwick, that this cannot be done.  
Furthermore, it is not obvious that the logical account restores the sense 
of a practical problem as we construed it above.6 Accepting the best of prac-
tical reason here would mean accepting mutually inconsistent principles: a 
problem for epistemic rather than practical conduct, and therefore a task for 
theoretical reason rather than for practical reason. Indeed, not only does the 
particular practical problem seen above shift off stage, but it actually dis-
appears. Accepting E and U means accepting mutually inconsistent princi-
ples. To the extent that practical reason is constrained by theoretical rea-
son, practical reason could hardly recommend us to act knowingly on di-
rectly logically inconsistent principles. But the practical problem stems pre-
cisely from the fact that practical reason does recommend us to act on those 
principles. A condition for this being the case is that accepting those princi-
ples is epistemically permissible or even feasible. Since on the logical ac-
count accepting E and U is not epistemically permissible or perhaps even 
feasible — they are mutually contradictory — then on the logical account 
practical reason does not even issue a prima facie requirement to act on ei-
ther E or U. The foremost and only requirement would be to revise or reject 
either or both of E and U, rather than act on them. No practical question 
will arise before we have done our epistemic duty. require.  
This is not to deny that at the heart of the dualism lies a central issue for 
epistemic conduct. Insofar as the two methods involve contradictory 
judgements, they are mutually inconsistent, and therefore the rational thing 
to do is revising and abandoning either or both principles with the hope of 
finding one (or more) that satisfy the conditions of self-evidence. But the 
epistemic issue should not replace the practical one: when faced with a con-
                                                 
6 On the other hand, logical accounts are well suited to explain the worries about self-
evidence and complete rationalisation. 
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flict case, we do need to act on either egoism or utilitarianism, although 
there is no way of telling whether we will do the right thing. Certainly it 
would be wrong and unreasonable to sit back and philosophize about better 
principles — no matter whether this is something that we eventually shall 
have to do. 
If the methods do not conflict purely because of their content, then we 
must take care to formulate such content accordingly. Here is a different, 
though no better, account of the dualism.7 
 
E: If A maximizes agent-utility, this is a pro tanto reason to do A. 
U: If A maximizes utility, this is a pro tanto reason to do A. 
 
On the pro tanto account E and U are not directly incompatible. Each 
merely says that we have a reason as far as certain considerations go. In the 
case of an act that maximizes agent-utility, but not utility overall, it is true 
that we have reason to do it, and we ought to do it as far as E goes, and it is 
false that we have reason to do it, and we ought to do it as far as U goes. E 
and U pull in different directions, and we do have something worth calling a 
practical conflict. But so far we only have a pluralism of reasons. The dra-
matic, “dualist” aspect of the dualism does not appear unless we add some 
other proposition, such as that E and U provide incommensurable reasons.8 
If egoistic and utilitarian reasons cannot ever be weighed against each 
other, then, whenever they conflict, we will be unable to know what to do, 
and will be deceived to the extent that we think we may find a rational con-
clusion by weighing them. The practical problem outlined above would ap-
ply: if reason cannot postulate a minimal commensurability, we will be un-
assisted by reason in our final decisions.  
Sidgwick may have implicitly assumed incommensurability through the 
metaphor of the points of view, as Derek Parfit suggests.9 To be able to 
weigh egoistic and utilitarian reasons presuppose that either such reasons do 
not stem from different points of view, or that the two points of view are 
not mutually exclusive, or that there is a third all comprehensive point of 
view. Sidgwick does not consider either the first or the third option. Fur-
ther, he denies the second one: changing point of view requires a normative 
Gestalt switch,10 such that as egoists, we can only appreciate our and others’ 
                                                 
7 Skorupski 2001: 69-70. 
8 See Parfit (ms.): 113. 
9 Ibidem: 114. 
10 Skorupski 2001: 71. 
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egoistic reasons, and as utilitarians, we can be described as appreciating 
what is good for anyone, forgetting that we are not just one among others. 
The two points of view exclude each other, not in the sense that they di-
rectly oppose one another (this would make for logical incompatibility), but 
rather we are unable to inhabit both at once or somehow retain, in the 
switch, what we have learned to appreciate.  
The pro tanto account, even with incommensurability, is not convincing. 
First, just where does the contradiction lie? If the “as far as” clause is part 
of the content of our judgements, these judgements are perfectly compatible 
all the way through. If God existed, he could prevent practical conflicts 
from happening, and save us from the consequences of incommensurability, 
but there would be no contradiction for him to remove. Hence, so this ac-
count does not explain why E and U present us with a special epistemic 
problem, if the source of the epistemic problem is their mutual incompatibil-
ity. 
But, secondly, Sidgwick would not accept the pro tanto account for epis-
temic reasons, albeit of a different sort. As he says, any modification of ap-
parently self-evident principles, such as to make them logically compatible, 
would “suggest a doubt whether the correctly qualified proposition will pre-
sent itself with the same self-evidence as the simpler but inadequate one; 
and whether we have not mistaken for an ultimate and independent axiom 
one that is really derivative and subordinate” (ME: 341). This may look 
paradoxical: the move to pro tanto saves the principles from mutual incon-
sistence, and therefore should return them as epistemically good candidates.  
There is a sense, however, in which the pro tanto versions will not provide 
ultimate and independent ethical principles, but really derivative and, more 
importantly, subordinate ones. As such, they are disqualified from being self-
evident, and therefore are not good enough candidates for setting up any 
dualism worth worrying about. (That is why we needed to add the further 
thought of incommensurability.) The idea is that self-evident principles 
must be “ultimate and independent” in their very application, i.e. they 
must be self-sufficient in their job of determining what is right to do, all 
things considered. But pro tanto principles are not in this sense “ultimate 
and independent”: in order to determine all-in rightness, they depend on 
there not being opposing pro tanto principles, or reasons against doing what 
they favour doing. On the other hand, egoism and impartialism, taken as all 
things considered principles, are at least meant to be in this sense ultimate 
and independent, however they may then fail to succeed because of how the 
world is like. Therefore a principle lacks independence, and so self-evidence, 
not only if I must look “above” to see its connection to a higher principle, 
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but also if it implicitly directs me to look “around” in search of other possi-
bly opposing principles.11 
It may be that Sidgwick is misguided here, by conflating self-evidence 
with self-sufficiency — but we are looking for an account that makes sense 
of the dualism as he sees it.12 So, guided by these last remarks, let us move 
on to a different one in terms of a conflict of sufficient reasons: 
 
E: If A maximizes agent-utility, this is always a sufficient reason to do A. 
U: If A maximizes utility, this is always a sufficient reason to do A. 
 
Roughly, a sufficient normative reason to do A is a consideration which 
fully explains why we ought to do A all things considered. So, like all things 
considered reasons, and unlike pro tanto reasons, sufficient reasons are in the 
business of adjudicating each practical case. But, like pro tanto ones, an ul-
timate sufficient reason does not rule out the presence of other, possibly 
competing, ultimate sufficient reasons. Sufficient reasons do their explana-
tory job independently but not despite of each other. The move to sufficient 
reasons allows to make sense of the claim of egoism and utilitarianism to 
provide verdicts rather than just pro tanto reasons, without making them in-
consistent with each other, i.e. without each claiming to provide the unique 
ultimate reasons. So E and U are not logically incompatible as they stand, 
and thus can be both self-evident. But the conflict will ensue whenever A 
maximizes agent-utility, but B maximizes utility, and I cannot do both. In 
all such cases I have sufficient reasons to do either. The problem is that 
weighing these reasons against each other would be worthless, however pos-
sible in principle. Since I always have sufficient reason to do either A or B, I 
am always allowed to treat either reason as the strongest one, as the one ca-
pable of deciding the case. And of course, if a further reason capable of ad-
judicating the case were needed, E and U would provide insufficient rea-
sons.13 So, the only hope, again, is a powerful being that did not let conflicts 
arise. If God existed (with all the necessary attributes), there would neces-
sarily be both egoistic and utilitarian sufficient reasons for the same actions. 
Sufficient reasons would not point in opposed directions.  
                                                 
11 This way of reconstructing Sidgwick I partly take from Schneewind 1977: 279-80; 372-
4. 
12 E.g. it doesn’t seem to be a problem for David Ross’s prima facie duties to be both self-
evident and pro tanto — in this sense, not “self-sufficient”.  
13 This is close to, but not exactly, Parfit’s reconstruction of the dualism. 
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This account, however, again makes no sense of there being a real con-
tradiction and not just an irresolvable practical conflict. Sufficient reasons 
determine directly what we ought to do, but each does not say: This is what 
and only what you ought to do. They do not function as excluding other pos-
sible sufficient reasons. Each claims conclusiveness for itself and not against 
other reasons.14 
Moreover, if the practical conflict cannot be expressed in an inconsistent 
proposition, it is somehow watered down. For practical reason would seem 
to issue a final, consistent, pronouncement: Do either the egoist best act or 
the utilitarian best act, since there are sufficient reasons for doing either. As 
long as we choose either disjunct, we are doing what practical reason re-
quires. And if we ask “Yes, but what should I do then?”, it is coherent, if 
somewhat obnoxious, to go on answering: “Do either the egoist best act or 
the utilitarian best act”. At this point, we will feel justified in thinking prac-
tical reason on our side all the way through, rather than only up to the 
point of deciding what to do. If there is sufficient reason for either disjunct, 
we should have no reason to worry whether we have done the right thing by 
choosing either. At least, this appears clear in less dramatic examples: if I 
have a sufficient reason for eating a chocolate icecream (the taste of choco-
late) and a sufficient reason for eating a vanilla one (the taste of vanilla), 
and no other sufficient reasons for doing something else, and I can’t eat 
both, then I will do the right thing whether I eat the chocolate or the va-
nilla icecream. I may regret having to choose (I’d rather have both) but, by 
definition, I do not need anything more than sufficient reasons to assure 
myself that I have done what is right. Sufficient reasons thus somewhat 
have the ability to turn the sense of conflict into a sense of comfortable 
choice.  
 
 
2. A Better Account 
 
Can a better account of the dualism be found? We have seen the conditions 
that need to be met: the dualism must not consist in a simple logical incom-
patibility, but must arise in virtue of both the content of egoism and utili-
tarianism, and the possibility that in a world without God the two methods 
conflict. Moreover, we need to state the content of the principles in such a 
way as to emphasize the contrast between opposing ethical perspectives. 
                                                 
14 Nor does the claim that E and U always provide sufficient reasons make any trouble in 
this respect. 
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The first step is to formulate each principle as determining all things consid-
ered rightness or reasonableness, rather than just pro tanto or sufficient rea-
sons, but without logically directly or indirectly denying each other: 
 
(1) E: A is all things considered right if, and because, A maximizes agent-
utility. 
(2) U: A is all things considered right if, and because, A maximizes utility. 
 
Plus, we need the possibility that an act may maximize, say, utility but 
not agent-utility and vice versa. The possibility would not arise if we could 
show that maximization of utility and agent-utility are necessarily insepa-
rable, as for instance would be the case if God existed. Excluding such cir-
cumstance, Sidgwick thinks that 
 
(3) It is possible for an act to maximize utility and not maximize agent-
utility, and vice versa. 
 
Therefore, 
 
(4) It is possible for an act to be all things considered right and not right. 
 
With (4) we come to see how egoism and utilitarianism lead to a genuine 
logical contradiction and how such contradiction is a consequence of facts 
about the principles and facts about the world. This reconstruction shows 
why the dualism is something to worry about both epistemically and practi-
cally. Epistemically, since E and U, plus a plausible assumption, lead to a 
contradiction, we should retract our judgement about the self-evidence of 
either or both. Indeed, leading to a contradiction is reason enough to doubt 
not only the self-evidence, but the very validity of either or both methods:  
 
We cannot [...] regard as valid reasonings that lead to conflicting conclu-
sions; and I therefore assume as a fundamental postulate of Ethics, that so 
far as two methods conflict, one or other of them must be modified or re-
jected. (ME: 6) 
 
The worry about “complete rationalisation” is obviously explained too. 
If in some possible cases we are told that the same act can be right and not 
right all things considered, we have a contradictory answer: which is tanta-
mount to claiming that in those cases practical reason gives us no answer. 
Notice the difference with the sufficient reasons account: according to that 
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account, in conflict cases practical reason gives us an answer, which, if un-
satisfactory, is surely a meaningful and practicable one: Do either the best 
egoist act or the best utilitarian act. Nor is the answer unsatisfactory simply 
because it has a disjunctive content, but rather because we feel that this 
specific disjunctive content cannot always be the right answer. So the new 
account makes sense of the epistemic trouble that Sidgwick saw implied by 
the dualism.  
Finally, we can give substance to the practical worry that accepting the 
best of practical reason leads to knowingly abandoning it (or rather to being 
knowingly abandoned by it) in problematic cases — when we need it most. 
Accepting the best of practical reason means accepting a contradiction as 
our guide in conflict cases. Since we cannot be knowingly guided by a con-
tradiction, in such cases we cannot be guided by practical reason. If we 
choose to do either act, on the one hand we know that we are listening to 
one voice of practical reason, and we are to that extent not being wholly un-
reasonable; on the other hand, we know there is another voice of practical 
reason with an equal claim to be listened to, so that we cannot see ourselves 
as acting from such a thing as the verdict of practical reason.  
Also, this reconstruction makes sense of the radicality Sidgwick attributes 
to both the egoist and the utilitarian points of view. First, it presents both 
principles as all things considered, i.e. having a claim to decide once and for 
all the normative status of every action. Second, only a further principle to 
the effect that, say, when the principles conflict, we should follow utilitari-
anism, could avoid conclusion (4). Such a principle of lexical order would 
imply some sort of commensurability between egoistic and utilitarian rea-
sons. But, as we have seen, moving from the egoist to the utilitarian point of 
view and back again implies a normative sort of Gestalt switch, such that 
features like other people’s well-being acquire and then lose ultimate norma-
tive relevance altogether, in a way that makes us unable to reach a stable 
middle ground where we can appreciate both egoist and utilitarian reasons 
as genuine, and therefore be in a position to compare them. That is why (4) 
is the conclusion of the argument. Thus we seem to have given each of 
Sidgwick’s ingredients its due importance in our understanding of the dual-
ism. 
 
 
3. The Responses to the Dualism 
 
The dualism, in the form just stated, is a philosophical embarrassment. 
However, the only way of getting round it that Sidgwick takes seriously is 
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the denial of premise (3). As Bart Schultz eloquently shows, Sidgwick’s per-
ennial interest in spiritism and telepathy reflected the need to find evidence 
for the possible existence of an afterlife where our self-sacrificing utilitarian 
efforts might be rewarded by a just and benevolent God.15 Of course he 
knows well that there are other options, for instance, qualifying and there-
fore rejecting (1) or (2) or both as they stand. As just quoted, he assumes as 
a fundamental postulate of Ethics, that so far as two methods conflict, one 
or other of them must be modified or rejected. But he never considers any 
such modification, partly because the “correctly qualified proposition will 
[not] present itself with the same self-evidence as the simpler but inade-
quate one” (ME 341). Suppose both egoism and utilitarianism were qualified 
as pro tanto principles, so as to avoid the contradiction (though not necessar-
ily the conflict). It is not obvious that they would lose anything in their ap-
parent or real self-evidence. Nor, as we have seen above, does the suggestion 
that mere pro tanto principles would, as such, be “derivative and subordi-
nate” (ibidem) cut any real philosophical ice, though it may be one of Sidg-
wick’s chief reasons. More probably, the dualistic view of practical reason 
has here its epistemological bearing. The self-evidence of a given principle 
can only be appreciated by occupying the point of view relevant to the prin-
ciple. Now, no weaker principles than (1) and (2) will appear self-evident 
when we occupy the point of view of the individual and of the universe, re-
spectively. Since there are no other points of view to occupy insofar as prac-
tical conduct is concerned, we cannot but endorse (1) and (2) as the best that 
practical reason has to offer. 
The last option for Sidgwick is to make sense of commensurability in or-
der to avoid (4). But he sets things for himself in a way that precludes this. 
For instance, Sidgwick would have welcomed an argument showing the ego-
ist that she is rationally required to take up the ethical “point of view of the 
universe”. But, in Sidwgick’s framework, such an argument would not work 
towards the commensurability of egoistic and utilitarian reasons. It is not as 
if we can start out as egoists and then be rationally brought to a wider per-
spective while continuing to appreciate egoistical reasons as such, so as to bal-
ance their weight against that of utilitarian reasons. When we rationally 
take up the point of view of the universe, egoistical considerations as such 
simply lose any normative weight. Any impartialist persuasion would lead 
us to replace our self-interested perspective with a utilitarian one, rather 
                                                 
15 See Schultz 2004 on this, and in general on the development and significance of the 
dualism throughout Sidgwick’s life. 
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than to expand the former into the latter. In other words, the effect of any 
such argument would be the complete rejection (1) in favour of (2). 
What is then the proper response to Sidgwick’s dualism? The answer to 
the question hinges on the way the dualism is understood, not only in its 
formal structure, as seen above, but in its philosophical significance. In this 
section I will not propose a response to the dualism, but rather aim at de-
scribing and evaluating some main reactions. We can fairly distinguish two 
major interpretive lines: (i) the dualism as presenting a general problem for 
normativity, and for morality in particular; (ii) the dualism as a failed at-
tempt at constructing a comprehensive ethical view. As we will see, the two 
lines are not mutually exclusive. 
The first title means to cover very different reactions to the dualism. 
What they have in common is the suggestion that Sidgwick has unveiled a 
deep structural or meta-ethical problem. I consider three such reactions.  
David Brink argued that what is at issue is the rationality and authority of 
morality.16 Recall that for Sidgwick utilitarianism is the best moral theory, 
in that it provides the only self-evident method for determining what is 
morally right and wrong. Other moral views, such as pluralist intuitionism, 
are shown to be defective in the self-evidence of their principles. Moreover, 
utilitarianism is the view that best systematizes common sense moral 
judgements. The dualism between utilitarianism and egoism thus is for 
Sidgwick coextensive with the contrast between morality itself and egoism. 
In conflict cases, morality and self-interest contradictorily pull in different 
directions.  
Brink adds a further element: egoism is the best theory of rationality, 
just like utilitarianism is the best moral theory. If so, “the dualism of prac-
tical reason reflects the conflict between the demands of morality and those 
of individual rationality” (Brink 1988: 291). According to this reading, what 
is rationally right could be morally wrong, and what is morally right could 
be rationally wrong. And so we get that the same act can be all things con-
sidered right and not right. However, as Brink points out, only an external-
ist about morality could envisage such a dualism. Externalism is the view 
that “the rationality of moral considerations depends upon factors external 
to the concept of morality (i.e. external to the fact that the considerations in 
question are moral considerations). Externalism implies that it makes sense 
to ask whether there is reason to be moral or to do as morality requires” 
(ibidem: 292). On the other hand, “internalism claims that it is true in vir-
                                                 
16 See Brink 1988 and 1992. 
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tue of the concept of morality that moral considerations necessarily provide 
agents with reasons for action” (ibidem).   
Now there is plenty of evidence that Sidgwick is an internalist. It is suf-
ficient to remember that, as methods of ethics, both morality and egoism 
are “rational procedures”: both present themselves as providing normative 
reasons for action. Moreover, the dualism is of the practical reason, that is, 
between two principles both belonging to practical reason, whereas on 
Brink’s reading the dualism would be between practical reason (egoism) and 
something else (morality as understood by utilitarianism). So for Sidgwick 
moral considerations seem to be intrinsically reasonable.  
While acknowledging this, Brink points out some reasons why Sidgwick 
might (and should) have been an externalist — and therefore why the dual-
ism should be seen as one between morality and rationality. First, if the 
conflict were just one within morality, then egoism should be a plausible 
moral view to be set as a rival to utilitarianism. But Sidgwick hesitates to 
give egoism this credit, mainly because “ethical egoism seems a very im-
plausible theory to explain and systematise our considered moral beliefs 
and, in particular, our beliefs about the nature and extent of our obligations 
to others” (ibidem: 302).  
However, Brink here misses the target. An internalist reading need not 
conceive of the dualism as one between competing views about moral obli-
gation.17 Internalism takes the reasonableness of morality and egoism as 
given, without thereby implying that egoism is a moral view. Egoism is, 
rather, a view about what we ought to do from the personal point of view. 
So the inability of egoism to explain and systematise beliefs about moral ob-
ligations is neither here nor there. It is sufficient that egoism explains and 
systematises beliefs about what we ought to do from the personal or pru-
dential point of view, i.e. when each of us considers her own existence alone, 
for it to count as a plausible “ethical” position to be set as a rival to utili-
tarianism. 
Second, only an externalist reading can, for Brink, make sense of how 
egoism and utilitarianism conflict while being logically compatible and 
therefore self-evident (ibidem: 305). Egoism and utilitarianism are mutually 
consistent as, respectively, theories of rationality and morality. They con-
flict, because it is not always rational (in one’s self-interest) to be moral (to 
act as utilitarianism requires). 
Brink still assumes that on internalism egoism and utilitarianism would 
directly contradict each other as being both theories about morality. We 
                                                 
17 Brink seems to see this but makes nothing of it (1988: 299, n.11). 
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know that internalists need not grant that these are conflicting theories of 
morality. They are better presented as conflicting theories of reasons. Brink 
could rejoinder that, were egoism and utilitarianism competing theories of 
reasons, they would be logically incompatible all the same, and therefore 
could not be both self-evident. In reply, however, we can point to the ac-
count offered above to show that egoism and utilitarianism can be theories 
of the same thing (what there is all things considered reason to do), and not 
be directly incompatible. And we have seen how Sidgwick’s talk of a “con-
tradiction” might be taken literally on such an account. Of course, the epis-
temic pitfall is that egoism and utilitarianism cannot both be self-evident. 
But then Brink’s externalist account, if it is supposed to be preferred because 
it overcomes the self-evidence problem, begins to look like a way to solve 
the dualism rather than helping us understand it. The dualism is worrying, 
inter alia, precisely because it implies that egoism and utilitarianism cannot 
both be self-evident.  
Finally, it seems that on Brink’s view we lose the sense in which there is 
a practical conflict to be dealt with. For externalism, we may conceivably 
fail to have reason to do what morality requires. In this scenario, moral con-
siderations would fail to be normative for us, just as much as the rules of eti-
quette might fail to be normative were there no reasons for us to follow 
them. But then how can moral considerations, whose normative force is 
contingent, conflict with an ever reason-providing egoism? It seems a plati-
tude that only fully normative considerations can meaningfully conflict 
with each other. So, on the one hand, if moral considerations are not norma-
tive, there is no intelligible conflict with egoism. On the other hand, if moral 
considerations “acquire” normativity, then by externalism it must be in vir-
tue of their coincidence with the results of some theory of reasons, and since 
egoism is the only other theory around, the dualism as Sidgwick under-
stands it just disappears. In sum, however important Brink’s problem may 
be, it simply is not Sidgwick’s.  
Parfit regards the dualism as raising a related, but different issue for 
morality. Here is how he formulates Sidgwick’s 
 
Dualism of Duty and Self-Interest: If duty and self-interest never conflict, we 
would always have most reason both to do our duty and to do what would 
be best for ourselves. But if we had to choose between two acts, of which 
one was our duty but the other would be better for ourselves, reason would 
give us no guidance. In such cases, we would not have stronger reasons to 
act in either of these ways. If we knew the relevant facts, either act would 
be rational. (ms.: 122) 
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This view is importantly different from Brink’s. The intrinsic reason-
ableness and authority of morality is not called into question. Sidgwick is a 
“moral rationalist”: we always have sufficient reason to do our duty or 
avoid acting wrongly. But, given the dualism, we cannot rule out that we 
might have sufficient or decisive reason to act wrongly. This would be the 
case every time our self-interest would be secured by a wrong action. And, 
to expand the thought beyond Sidgwick’s views, we might have sufficient 
reasons to act wrongly provided by non-moral considerations of special rela-
tionships, or by what would be the impartially best outcome, in a context 
where this — contra Sidgwick — does not necessarily determine what we 
have strongest moral reason to do.  
Sidgwick’s dualism thus poses the conceptually open question: Is what 
we have most reason to do always morally right or permissible to do? If the 
answer is no, because sometimes what we have sufficient reason to do may 
be morally wrong, then morality is undermined in its ambition to be the su-
preme guide of practical reason. The point, by now familiar, is that moral-
ity, just like utilitarianism, cannot always have the last word on what we 
have most reason to do, because, if the dualism makes sense, at least often 
there is no such single last word to be had. (The term “often” is meant to re-
duce somewhat the extent of the dualism, as in Parfit’s view of the dualism 
discussed below. For Sidgwick, there is never a single last word to be had in 
cases of conflict.)  
Of course, the gravity of the problem will vary depending on what we 
regard as wrong. For instance, if it is held that it may on occasion be mor-
ally permissible to give priority to one’s self-interest or that of one’s near 
and dear when an impartially better outcome could be brought about, then 
the problem is often softened. But if it is always morally wrong to produce 
even an impartially slightly worse outcome by preferring a better outcome 
for oneself or for certain others, then it will often be the case that we have 
sufficient reasons to do what is wrong. Of course, since morality determines 
both positive and negative sufficient reasons, it will also be the case that we 
have sufficient reason not to do what is wrong. However, morality will only 
enjoy a limited authority over practical reason. We can take this to be a 
genuine legacy from Sidgwick’s dualism.  
It is worth mentioning another “structural” reading of the dualism. It is 
tempting to see the conflict as generated by the different kinds of reasons 
that become salient from the personal and universal perspectives. Personal 
reasons are given by facts that make reference to the agent who has them: 
my happiness gives me reasons to promote it, your happiness gives you rea-
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sons to promote it, and so on. Impartial reasons are given by facts that 
make no essential reference to the agent who has them: my happiness, 
yours, hers… give anyone a reason to promote it as someone’s happiness. 
The dualism would thus reflect a fundamental contrast between agent-
relative and agent-neutral reasons As such, it can be expanded into a con-
flict between any views which countenance the same kind of thing as to be 
promoted (say, happiness, or perfection, or what have you) but differ as to 
who is to promote what, and so as to whether their reasons are agent-
relative, or agent-neutral.18 Unless we have an argument for discarding one 
type of reasons, there will be conflict. 
This account is too thin to make sense of a deep dualism. If the turning 
point is the relativity or neutrality of a reason with respect to the agent, as 
defined above, then the dualism could be apparently solved by making all 
reasons agent-relative. Any agent-neutral reason-giving consideration could 
be stated in a way that gives every agent an agent-relative reason. For in-
stance, one could state agent-neutral impartial reasons as self-referential al-
truist reasons. John’s happiness, as someone’s happiness, gives anyone an 
agent-neutral reason to promote it. But John’s happiness, as someone else’s 
happiness, gives anyone but John an agent-relative reason to promote it. 
For each agent but John, the reason-giving fact will be that “the happiness 
of someone else than me can be promoted”. In self-referential altruism, the 
reason-giving fact will make ineliminable reference to the agent, albeit in a 
simply negative form: “x’s happiness is not mine”.19 Of course, the imper-
sonal reason each of us has to promote their own happiness merely as some-
one’s happiness cannot be translated as a self-referential altruist reason. But 
naturally each agent continues to have agent-relative egoist reasons to care 
about his own happiness only. Now, if there are only agent-relative reasons 
around, it looks like the conflict will be formally solved. But such a solution 
would ring hollow. Having eliminated agent-neutrality and the “point of 
view of the universe” does not mean that we now appreciate all our reasons 
as stemming from our personal point of view. Surely we need to occupy the 
personal point of view in order to appreciate self-referential reasons, but 
merely occupying that point of view does not rationally commit us to ap-
preciating all the reasons that could be so appreciated. The transition from 
egoism to pure self-referential altruism may still require a Gestalt switch 
even remaining within the personal point of view. 
                                                 
18 See Hills 2003 for a detailed argument. 
19 See Broad 1942. 
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Moreover, the sense of conflict does not go. Some of the fiercest moral di-
lemmas arise between agent-relative reasons, such as when we would need 
to sacrifice our own life in order to save the life of someone to whom we are 
strongly attached. A fortiori, the sense of conflict cannot go if the sacrifice 
would save someone to whom we are merely related by “otherness”. Confin-
ing the dualism within the personal point of view does not by any means al-
leviate it. Finally, these cases show that incommensurability can persist 
even if all reasons are agent-relative.20 In sum, Sidgwick’s dualism is best 
not taken to show a purely general and structural contrast between agent-
relativity and agent-neutrality.  
The second type of reading regards the dualism as an admirable but 
failed attempt at a constructive and comprehensive ethical view. According 
to these interpretations, Sidgwick is right insofar as he picks out two dis-
tinct and competing sources of normative reasons, but then fails to put 
them together in a consistent outlook, or exaggerates their incommensura-
bility, or leaves out other sources of normativity. These theorists take their 
job as essentially consisting in smoothing Sidgwick over in order to come to 
a more reasonable and practicable view, while retaining the underlying ten-
sions that must accompany any dualist or pluralist theory worth this name. 
Samuel Scheffler’s “hybrid” theory (1994) makes room for agent-centred 
prerogatives, as grounded in the independence of the agent’s perspective, to 
be set as limiting the moral demands of consequentialism. Likewise, Roger 
Crisp suggests a “dual source view” (1996) whereby pro tanto reasons stem 
both from moral requirements as given by utilitarianism and by the per-
sonal point of view. John Skorupski offers a more complex picture, whereby 
the dualism becomes a pluralism, as there are more ultimate sources of rea-
sons for action than Sidgwick recognized. But among these, impartial rea-
sons are set out as indefeasible and finally determinative of what we have 
overall reason to do — because they only are the expression of “pure” prac-
tical reason (2001: 78ff).21 None of these views however really tries to deal 
with Sidgwick’s worries.  
The difficulty with Sidgwick’s dualism is not only that it implies in-
consistent normative statements. Taken as a normative view, it also has 
deeply counterintuitive consequences, as Parfit shows. In all conflict cases, 
we could rationally do either the best egoist act or the best utilitarian act, 
                                                 
20 Parfit (ms.: 118-9) seems to believe the agent-relative/agent-neutral contrast is respon-
sible for incommensurability or imprecise comparability. 
21 Broad’s self-referential altruism (1942) can also be seen as a constructive response to 
Sidgwick’s dualism . 
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whatever the strength of the relative reasons. E.g., we could rationally save 
ourselves from one minute of discomfort rather than saving a million people 
from death or agony. But “these are unacceptable conclusions. If we acted 
in such a way, the main reactions of others would rightly be horror and in-
dignation. But, as well as being very wrong, our act would not be rational” 
(Parfit ms.: 115). This results from Sidgwick taking egoistic and utilitarian 
reasons to be wholly incommensurable, such that a strong impartial case in 
favour of an action (saving a million people from death or agony) cannot 
outweigh a weak egoist case in favour of a different action (saving ourselves 
one minute of discomfort), and vice versa. To be able to balance these rea-
sons would mean to occupy the personal and the universal points of view at 
one time, and this, we know, is impossible for Sidgwick.   
Parfit thinks the point of view metaphor is better discarded. As he says: 
 
When we are trying to decide what we have most reason to do, we ought to 
ask this question from our actual point of view. We should not ignore some 
of our actual reasons merely because we would not have these reasons if we 
had some other, merely imagined point of view. We can also claim that, to 
be able to compare partial and impartial reasons, we don’t need some third, 
neutral point of view. We can compare these two kinds of reason from our 
actual, personal point of view. And some reasons of either kind can be 
stronger than, or outweigh, some reasons of the other kind (ms.: 117). 
 
This move also does away with the embarrassing Sidgwickian contradic-
tion. The duality of standpoints led Sidgwick to think of each set of reasons 
as supreme, i.e. as determining overall rightness. But once we bring reasons 
together into a single point of view, each also loses such absolute aspira-
tions, and we avoid the conclusion that the same act can be overall right 
and not right. At worst there will be sufficient reasons for actions that can-
not be performed at the same time. But that involves no contradiction.  
However, Parfit concedes to Sidgwick that all we can afford is only impre-
cise comparability: while different reasons are comparable, and thus each 
capable in principle to be stronger than another, there might be no precise 
truths as to their relative strength (ibidem: 113). Moreover, it may often be 
that the comparison, while possible, does not actually yield any unique an-
swer as to which reason is strongest. Therefore Parfit proposes a revised ver-
sion of the dualism:22 
                                                 
22 Cp. Phillips’ “indeterminacy view” of Sidgwick’s dualism (1998), whereby we never 
have a determinate answer. 
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Wide Value-based Objective Views: When one possible act would make things 
go in the way that would be impartially best, but some other act would 
make things go best either for ourselves or for those to whom we have close 
ties, we often have sufficient reasons to act in either of these ways (ibidem: 
117-8). 
 
How often we end up with a disjunctive requirement will depend on fur-
ther assumptions. As we hinted in the previous section, disjunctive require-
ments are not necessarily a failure of practical reason. This said, Parfit 
wants to leave room for situations in which the choice of either disjunct in-
volves a deep sense of conflict, as when we have sufficient reasons to either 
save our own life or the life of many strangers. So Parfit’s dualism is an ex-
ample of what needs to be done in order to get round Sidgwick’s problems 
while acknowledging their relative inescapability.  
It is worth concluding by noting that Sidgwick himself would not have 
liked such a solution. Abandoning the metaphor of the opposed standpoints 
provides us with principles of practical reason which are both weaker than 
they at first sight looked, because they no longer present themselves as su-
preme.  
Moreover, Sidgwick might doubt that impartial reasons can really be 
appreciated once we leave the point of view of the universe. As we have 
seen, some of their significance can be formally retained by viewing strang-
ers as part of one’s personal point of view, in that they are connected to one-
self by some thin relation of “being other than me”.  
First, this particular proposal sounds paradoxical: the personal point of 
view, by definition, should be such that whoever and whatever is not me or 
mine lies beyond its normative scope. Second, even if we can make sense of 
others, simply as strangers or sentient beings, as lying within the personal 
point of view, they would be positioned at the farthest border of such a 
point of view. And while their relevant features, e.g. their well-being, would 
not for that reason count for less than those of “closer” inhabitants, it seems 
that, when a conflict arises between two equal distributions of well-being, 
the fact that in one case the benefit would be distributed among “closer” 
people might temptingly look like a decisive reason for us to prefer that dis-
tribution, other things being equal. In other words, if rejecting the meta-
phor means refusing to consider things from an imagined “the point of view 
of the universe”, then impartial reasons risk a loss in authority which is not 
paralleled by a corresponding loss for personal and egoistical reasons. And 
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Sidgwick would have rather seen egoist reasons lose some of their authority 
than utilitarian ones.  
Of course it might be that the actual point of view through which Parfit 
suggests we conduct our deliberation is not personal in any partialistic 
sense. But it would need to be shown why it is not so. One thought might be 
that, given a certain conception of personal identity, the relation one’s pre-
sent self has to one’s future self could be as weak as, or even weaker than, 
the relation one’s present self has to other present and future people.23 So 
there would be no a priori reason to view facts about me and what is con-
nected to me as in principle grounding stronger practical reasons than facts 
about other, unconnected people. The authority of impartial reasons would 
be no more questioned than the authority of personal and egoistical reasons. 
This discussion however leads us into metaphysics, and while Sidgwick 
would not have disliked a metaphysical solution to the dualism, it would 
take a different paper to explore such a possibility.  
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